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L Introduction
Fabrication plants occupy a key position in any nuclear fuel cycle. From
the p01nt of view of fuel cycle optimisation, the fabrication costs require
attention, as they influence significantly the fuel cycle costs of any
power reactor. In connection with safeguards, particular attention has to
be paid to fabrication plants, as both uranium and plutonium are present
in a fairly inactive and aecessible form through all the process steps in
such plants.
In the present pape~ some estimates have been made on the growth of fabrieation
demands in Germany in the eoming years. Some measuring methods whieh eould be
of interest for fabrieation plants, have been discussed. Some eonceptual de-
signsof fabrication plants have also been presented whieh have been speeially
prepared to analyse and incorporate various safeguards requirem~nts based on
the principle of controlling the flow of fissile material at strategie points.
Finally, the total efforts required in implementing all the safeguards measures
at these strategie points have been estimated for these plants.
l)Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
2)Transurane Institut, Euratom, Karlsruhe
3)Alpha-Chemie und Metallurgie GmbH. (ALKEM), Karlsruhe
22. Fabrication Requirements in a Country
The fissile material throughputs in a fabrication plant influenee the
safeguards measures in a significant manner. The uncertainties with which
the fissile material amounts can be determined at a particular strategie
point, are a direct measure of the accuracy with which statements on the
diverted material can be made. And for a given measuring accuraey, the larger
the throughput of fissile material in a plant, the larger is the uncertainty
with which they can be determined. It is therefore, important to know the
throughputs which are to be expected for fabrication plants in the coming
decades in a country. However, the total required throughput in a given year
will not necessarily be covered by a single plant but will have to be covered
by several plants.
The fabrication requirements for fissile materials in any country are de-
termined mainly by the rate of penetration of nuclear energy and the types
of reactors used to produce this energy. Analytical and numerical methods
which can be used to estimate this requirement have been discussed in great
detail elsewhere L-l,2_7. These analyses show that the throughput in a fabri-
cation plant ina given year depends ultimately on two reactor parameters. The
burn-up determines the running requirement of the reactors already installed
and the rating determines the requirement of the reactors to be installed in
that year. It is also interesting to note in this connection, that for a given
year and a given nuclear system, the fabrication requirement will always be
greater, in the seventies even by a factor of two, than the reprocessine re-
quirement.
The estimated fabrication capacities in the next two decadeS for Germany,
for a light water reactor - fast breeder combination, have been shown in
Table 11. The capacities for a given year have been broken down ror enriched
uranium (LWR), depleted uranium (radial blanket for fast breeders) and plutonium
uranium mixtures (core and axial blanket for fast breeders). Table I gives
the data which were used in estimating these capacities. Table 11 shows that
fabrication requirements for light water type reactors would be around 550 t/a
in 1970 going up to about 1300 t/a in 1980. The fabrication capacity for
plutonium containing fue1 is expected to be around 10 t/a in 1975 and 100 t/a
around 1982.
33. Measuring Methods in a Fabrication Plant
Any measuring method to be applicable for safeguards purposes should fulfil
a number of basic conditions {-3_7. The more significant of these conditions
are summarised in fable 111. These conditions are particularly applicable to
indirect methods for pins and subassemblies at the process end of a fabrication
plant. A large number of such methods receiving active attention of different
research groups, have already been discussed in detail {-4-9_/. Therefore,
only a short description of a few measuring systems which are being investi-
gated at Karlsruhe Research Center, are summarised in this paper.
3.1 Calorimeter
The radio calorimetry, which utilizes the ~-decay heat of the plutonium isotopes
for est1.mating the plutonium content in a given amount of nuclear fuel, is a
fairly known method. The heat outputs from a typical mixture cf plutonium
isotopes are shown in Table IV. A prototype calorimeter was built by the Firm
ALKEM in collaboration with the Karlsruhe Research Center, in whieh plutonium
eontaining fuel pins can be measured. This calorimeter was tested for aecuracy
during the framework of a safeguards experiment in a fabrication plant ~lO,11_7.
The total measuring error (coefficient of variation of l-a value) in a calori-
meter of this type, consists of three different types of errors, namely (a) re-
produeibility of the results (which 1.s a function of the calorimeter set-up),
(b) errors in the determination of Pu isotopes and, (e) error in the determina-
tion of the age of Am-241 produced 1.nitially from Pu-24l. The over all error
in this ealorimeter was found to vary between 0.8 - 1.2 7.. The eontribution of
errors from the different sourees is also indieated in Table IV. An analysis
of these errors and the present ealorimeter set-up indieate, that the eontr1.bu-
tion of reprodueibility can be reduced to around 0.1 % and that of the isotopes
to around 0.35 % so that an overall error of + 0.4 % appears to be attainable
in a commercial calorimeter of this type. In collaboration with the Karlsruhe
Research Center, the firm ALKEM is now engaged in designing calorimeters for
industrial scale production. In the final design, the neutron generated by
spontaneous fission of Pu-240 and by ~-n reaction will also be measured, to
make the system as tamperproof as practieable. The ealorimeter is expeeted to
be loeated permanently at the proeess end of the plant and to be used both
by the plant operators and the safeguards personnel.
43.2 Slowing Down Time Spectrometer L-4, 9_7
The heat release due to a-decay in uranium is 5 to 10 orders of magnitude
lower than that in plutonium. As a result radio calorimetry cannot be used
for uranium with the presently known sensitivity of the system. A slowing
down time spectrometer is under development, in which typical fuel pins for
light water reactors, containing upto 5 % U-235 (rest U-238), can be interrogat-
ed for their U-235 content. This method is based on the fact that short perio-
dic neutron pulses from a neutron generator will sustain a relatively narrow
energy distribution while slowing down in a lead pile. There exists a simple
relation between the mean neutron energy of the distribution and the slowing
down time as shown in Fig. 1. If the fuel pin to be investigate~ is introduced
in the lead pile, in the path of the neutron beam, fission of U-235 and Pu-239
is initiated by the impinging neutrons, provided they have energies in one of
the resonance regions. The time dependent fission rate, which may be measured by
accounting the induced fission neutrons with proton recoil counters, is pro-
portional to the fuel content of the pin.
Although this method can be used to estimate both U-235 and plutonium, the
industrial instrument is being developed by the firm INTERATOM, Hensberg
Germany (in collaboration with the Karlsruhe Research Center) mainly for
the estimation of U-235 content in fuel pins for light water reactors. Research
work tö determine accurately U-235 and Pu in the presence of each other,
is being continued at the Karlsruhe Research Center.
Some important data on the spectrometer are presented in Table VI. The whole
system is expected to be ready by the end of 1970.Because of the heavy bulk
of the apparatus and the fact that it would be useful to the plant operators
also, it is expected to be permanently installed at the fabrication plant.
3.3 n,y Process L-4, 8 7
The measuring method, based on n,y reaction, which is also being investigated
at Karlsruhe, is in its initial phase of development. In this method, the
fissile material under investigation i8 exposed to neutrons of energy high
enough to avoid destortion due to resonance self shielding. When the incident
neutron hits the target nucleus, a compound nucleus results. Because of the
5binding energy ofa neutron(5 to 8 MeV) and its kinetic energy, this nucleus
will necessarily be in an excited state. This excitation energy is dissipated
by emission of y-rays. It is expected that the fissile material isotopes
of interest (e.g. U-235, Pu-239, Pu-240), will show some isotope specific
y lines in the capture y-ray spectrum. These specific y-lines can then be
utilized in estimating the isotopes in a quantitative non-destructive and
indirect manner. This method has been tested successfully for some low molecu-
lar isotopes. Detailed investigations are being carried out for the fissile
and the fertile isotopes.
3.4 Methods for Feed and Waste-Streams
The methods discussed above are mainly for fissile material assay in completed
pins or subassemblies, although the calorimetric method can be used to determine
plutonium content in bird cages at the feed point of a fabrication plant also.
Other, fairly accurate direct methods are available for determining the fissile
material content in the feed streams. Besides this, in practice, the shipper's
data on the fissile material content in the feed stream of a fabrication plant
will also be available for establishing the material balance. Therefore, the
measuring methods at the feed point have not been discussed here.
Two methods are under active investigation for estimating fissile material
content of the solid and heterogeneous wastes from a fabrication plant. They
are,(a) neutron counting for plutonium containing wastes and, (b) measurement
of delayed neutron for wastes containing uranium and plutonium. The neutron
counting method was used for the waste streams in the control experiment men-
tioned earlier /-10, 11 7. The accuracy for this method, averaged over the
whole experi~ent was found to be around + 8 %. The neutron counting method is
not tamperproof in its present form and further work is being carried out to
improve it. The method using delayed neutron is still at the initial stage
of its development.
64. Conceptual Designs
Three conceptual designs for fabrication plants were prepared in which
the major requirements of a safeguards system, based on the principle of
fissile material control at strategic points, were incorporated. One of the
referenceplants is for LWR fuel elements with low enriched U-235, and the
other two are for fast breeder fuel elements with plutonium, for two different
yearly throughputs. The characteristics of these plants are summarised in
Table VI. Their simplified layouts are shown in Figs. 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
4.1 General Remarks
As can be surmised from Table 11, the throughputs of these plants correspond
to the fabrication requirements in Germany, covering the period mid seventy
to early eighty. All operational and process improvements (automation, ratio-
nalisation of process steps and data processing,reduction of fissile material
wastes etc.), which appear feasible during this period have been incorporated
in these plants. Besides this, the guiding principle for these conceptual de-
signs, has always been to arrange the layout in such a way that all the fissile
material in input and output streams and in inventories could be conveniently
safeguarded at a very limited number of strategie points, and that the areas
in between these points could be effectively contained. A detailed analysis
of the layouts shows fairly conclusively that safeguards (according to the
concept of strategie point control) and plant rationalisation requirements
are highly correlated • Both the safeguarding authority and the plant
operators are interested in:
a) The establishment of an accurate material balance with as little
time lag as practicable.
b) A reduction 1n the recoverable and irrecoverable losses.
c) A reduction 1n the material unaccounted for (MUF)
d) A rational data processing system for the establishment of material
balance.
e) A reduction 1n the total efforts (time, personnel and investment)
in obtaining information for the preparation of material
balance.
7f) An efficient containment system for the whole plant.
Therefore, a fabrication plant can always be laid out in such a way as
to optimize the effectiveness of both the safeguards measures and the
plant operation.
4.1.1 Scraps and Wastes
Present day experience on fabrication scraps and wastes has been somewhat
discouraging. From the point of view of safeguards, three basic problems appear
to be associated with thenl. Firstly, they may form a fairly large fraction of
the total input; secondly, they are quite often obtained in forms which cannot
be measured conveniently and accurately; and thirdly, they are normally collec-
ted over several fabrication campaigns and recovered at a much later date, so
that a closure of material balance after a single campaign becomes difficult.
These problems were analysed in some detail while preparing the conceptual
design of these plants.
a) Scraps: Scrap material has been defined in this paper as that part
of fissile material from a process stream which is chemically pure but
because of some physical shortcomings ( geometry, density, etc. ), cannot
be used in the subsequent process steps in a production line. For ceramic
fuel pellets, considered for all the three reference plants, the major
part of the scraps is obtained during or after the sintering step, in the
form of low-density or geometrically defective pellets, which are not
according to the specifications. Fabrication experience, particularly
with plutonium containing pellets, has shown that upto about 5 % of the
input streams, such scraps can be recirculated back to some previous
process steps, without any special treatment. If the fraction be higher,
it has to be treated in a scrap recovery process before a recirculation.
Upto about 20 % of the feed stream, such sintered scrap can be dry oxidised
(in air at around 800°C) and fed back to the homogenizing step. In both
these cases, these scraps do not appear as aseparate stream fathe material
balance and therefore, need not be separately accounted for for safe-
guards purposes. They would just increase the internal hold-up of the plant.
8If these scraps are not recirculated continuously and immediately
or if apart of the scrap is kept over after a campaign, they can be
homogenised quite easily and brought in batches to a strategie point
where their plutonium content can be determined accurately.
It is important to note that recirculation of 20 % of the feed
material in th~ form of scrap, is extremely undesirable from
operational aspects as it reduces the actual throughput of the plant
in the same proportion and therefore, affects the overall economics
of the plant in an adverse manner. In commercially operating plants,
the percentage of scrap formation under normal operating conditions
is expected to be wen below 20 %. If necessary, it can always be esti-
mated at strategi c points with the same accuracy as that at the feed point.
b) Wastes: The waste stream has been defined as that part of the fissile
material flow in a plant, in which the chemical purity or concentration
of the fissile material has been degraded to such an extent that it has
either to be discarded or can be recovered only by complicated, fairly
expensive process steps. Waste streams roay be both heterogeneous and
homogeneous. Normally, fissile material is recovered from waste streams
only if the attainable price is expected to be higher than the cost of
recovery. Fissile material dust from absolute filters, scrapings from
glove boxes, grinding slime (if grinding is used) are typical examples
of heterogeneous, recoverable wastes; plastic sacks, gloves, cleaning
papers etc. can norrnal1y be taken as irrecoverable heterogeneous wastes;
chemical solutions produced from sample analyses are typical recoverable
homogeneous wastes whereas, mother liquor from a wet recovery plant is
regarded as irrecoverable homogeneous wastes.
In normal practice, the recoverable wastes are stored over a long per iod
before treating them in a waste recovery plant as, such a plant operates
economically over a certain capacity. The measuring methods known at pre-
sent, to not permit an accurate estimate of fissile material content in
anyof these wastes.
At present it 1.S quite common to ohtain around 1 % of the feed stream
as irrecoverable wastes. A fairly detailed research and development
activity has been initiated at Karlsruhe Center to analyse the various
9sources of waste materials and the means of reducing them in commercial-
ly operating fabrication plants. Preliminary results indicate that these
losses can be reduced drastically with increasing size and increasing
automation of the plant.
Typical values of fissile material concentrations in waste streams which
are expected in the reference plants and which form the basis for the
subsequent effort analysis, have been presented in Table VII. The reduction
of fissile material amounts in the different irrecoverable waste streams as
compared to the present day values, has been possible because of the follow-
ing improvements:
(a) Automation of process steps which reduces the number of transfers
fram outside areas to the glove boxes, and reduces the use of clean-
ing papersand the number of plastic sacks. The number of gloves to
be discarded does not increase proportionately with increasing size
of the plant so that its contribution to the total amount decreases.
All these factors cause a reduction in the fissile material concenträ-
tion in heterogeneous waste streams from plutonium fabrication plants.
(b) Reduction in the number of samples' to be chemically analysed. For the
reference plant 111 (large Pu-plant), a further reduction in the
number of samples to be taken fram the process streams by increasing
the hight to diameter ratio of the pellets to two. This causes a
reduction in the total number of pellets in this plant by a factor
of two.
The recoverable and irrecoverable wastes in homogeneous form are obtained
from analytical solutions containing fissile material, mother liquor
from a waste recovery unit and from fissile dust from filters and glove
box scrapings, which are recovered chemically.
By a rigid quality control and automati c operation, the number of sarnples
to be taken from different process steps for chemical analysis can be re-
duced. Besides, apart of the chemical analyses can be replaced with non-
destructive analytical methods. As in the case of gloves, the arnount of
fissile material dust and the glove box scrapings do not increase liniarly
with increasing capacity of the plant.
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4.2 Layout of LWR Fuel Plant, Ref. Case I (Tables VI, VII, Fig. 2)
4.2.1 Proceis Description
The fabrication plant has a capacity of 230 t/a of 3 % enriched uranium.
It is estimated that in Germany two such plants would be required in the early
seventies.
The feed material is obtained in the form of enriched UF6 in cylinders,and
stored in a compartmentalised large storage area located in the cellar of the
plant (Fig. 2). From this storage area the flow of uranium through the various
process steps in the plant is arranged in the form of an inverted U. The com-
pleted subassemblies, which are the final product from this plant, are also
stored in the same storage area. The spece between the parallel arms of the
flow is used for a wet waste recovery unit, to which all the recoverable waste
streams from the different process steps are fed. This unit operates continuous-
ly and the recov~red uranium is fed back to the homogenizing step. The scraps,
as defined in this paper, are not expected to exceed 10 % of the feed and are
fed back directly and continuously to a suitable process step. The waste stream
from the scrap recovery unit, in the form of liquid solution with traces of
uranium, is stored temporarily in a 10 m3 tank which i5 also located in the
same general storage area. It is to be no ted that in this plant, this is the
only waste stream containing fissile material which leaves the plant. The re-
coverable waste streams are fed directly to the waste recovery unit.
The operation and maintenance personnel can enter or leave the process area
only through the personnel lock under normal condition. The emergency exits are
normally sealed with an electrical alarm signal system.
The walls of the plant enclosing the various process and auxiliary steps ean
be regarded as the containment for the process uranium. The conti.nuity of
the containment is guaranteed with the help of an electromagnetic signal
system.
4.2.2 Strategie Points
Because of the particular way the plant has been laid out, all the ingoing
and outgoing streams eontaining uranium, pass through the general storage area.
This area has therefore been laid out as a strategie point. Since for this
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plant, the completed pins and not the subassemblies,will be measured,
the pin measuring station has also been included in this strategie point.
All the measuring units (namely, a weighing machine and a sampling point for
the UF6 stream, a lead pile spectrometer for the pins and a storage tank
with sampling point and a chemical analysis unit for the waste stream), which
are required by the safeguards system to establish an independent material
balance, are located in this area. The electrical signals showing the con-
tinuity of the containment and the operation ofthe personnel lock, are also
b~ought to this area. This means that this plant has only one strategie point
at which all the safeguards activities can be carried out. The service of a
single safeguards personnel i8 required to execute these safeguards measures
for the plant.
4.3 Layout of FBR Fuel Plant, Ref. ease II (Tables VI, VII, Fig. 3)
4.3.1 Process Description
This plant is capable of producing fast breeder fuel pins for the core and the
axial zone of a reactor. The capacity is around 8.8 kg of Pu and 35 kg of
depleted uranium per day and corresponds to the requirement in Germany during
the early seventies. The plant has been designed by the firm Alkem and is
at present under construction in Hanau, Germany. It has been laid out to fabri-
cate converted fuel pins containing recycled plutonium as welle The follot-1ing
description is for the fast breeder fuel, as it corresponds to the maximum
th~oughput of plutonium for the plant.
The fissile material is received at the plant in the form of powders of pluto-
nium and uranium oxide. The plutonium is supplied in standard bird cages and
is stored at first in the general storage area. The depleted uranium is
received at the plant ].n special sealed containers and js transfered pneuma-
tically to a silo inside the plant. Because of the ext~emely low value of
depleted uranium, its flow will not be safeguarded independently in this plant.
The final product from this plant is in the form of fuel pins containing
pellets of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxide in the middle part (core
zone) and similar type of pellets with only depleted uranium oxide in the
top and bot tom part of the pin for the axial blanket zone. Assembling of
these pins will be carried out by the reactor vendor. The completed pins are
stored in the same storage area before transport.
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The ceramic scraps obtained from different process steps will be recovered
internally. In case it has to be stored for a longer period or sent tü same
other recovering facility outside the plant, it will be homogenized and
brought to the same fissile material storage area.
All the irrecoverable heterogenous and homogeneous wastes will be brought
to this storage area also before disposal.
Because of the extreme danger associated with the handling and disposal of
plutonium, very stricthealth physics and criticality controls are imposed
by the plant operators themselves on all the process steps in the plant. This
implies that all the input and output streams to and from the plant have to
be controlled by the operators also.
As in the case of uranium plant, the walls enclosing the process steps forms
the containment for the fissile material inside the plant. The emergeney exits
are normally sealed with an electrical signal system which also shows the
continuity of the containment.
The offices, personnel locks laundries ete. are loeated in aseparate
building which is connected to the process area with a passage way. A personnel
lock has been installed in this passage way. All the operation and maintenanee
personnel ean enter the process area only through this personnel lock.
4.3.2 Strategie Points
All the materials leaving and entering the plant, have to pass through the
general storage area. Therefore, this has been laid out as the first strategie
point. The measuring instruments, the safing and sealing units and other
items required for executing a11 the safeguards measures for the plant, are
located in this area.
The personnel lock represents the second strategie point. A specially developed
y-lock has been installed here which can detect less than 1 gm of plutonium
carried by a person going through the personnel lock, The y-lock gives an
alarm and bars the passage in case a person tries to carry this amount of
plutonium with hirn across the y-lock.
13
Since the signals for testing the continuity of the containment and the
alarm signal fram the y-lock can be brought to the first strategie point~
all the safeguards activities can be carried out in this area. It is estimated
that a single safeguards personnel ean safeguard the whole plant.
4.4 Layout of FBR Fuel Plant, Ref. ease 111 (Tables VI, VII, Fig. 4)
4.4.1 Process Description
The layout of this plant has been discussed in detail [-10, 12 /. 1'his plant
corresponds to the plutonium fabrication requirement in Germany during the
early eighties. It is laid out to fabricate only fast reactor fuel subassemblies
eontaining core and axial fuel. This plant has been designed in eollaboration
with the Transuranium Institute, Euratom, and ineorporates to a high degree
eoneeivable automation and rationalisation teehniques.
The plutonium input is in the form of plutonium oxide pmvder. Depleted uranium
for the core zone is also reeeived as oxi de powder. Hmvever, HS opposed to thE'
Ref. ease 11, the uranium for the axial blanket is obtained in the form of
sintered oxide pellets, whieh ean be fj lied direct1y into the pins without any
further proeessing.
The final produet is in the form of completed fuel subassemblies, each eon-
taining about 330 pins with core and axial fuel.
1'he seraps from the different process steps are continuouslY recovered 1n a
dry oxidising unit and recirculated back to an appropriate proces$ step. A
wet waste recovery unft reeovers p ltl t on i 11111 from homogE'oeous wastes and di s-
cards i rrecoverable wastes in liquid fonn. Heterogeneous ~-lastes are obtained
only with irrecoverable amounts of plutonium and discarded direetly.
The pellets have a height to diameter rad 0 of 2 as 0PIlosen to around 1.2 in
the Ref. plant 11. This causes a reduction 1.n the number of pellets and hence
the number of chemical analysis to control them. 'i'he grinding step aftp-r sinter-
ing has also been eliminated in this plant, as i t i s expected that by the time
the plant goes into operation, direct sintering giving specified diamensions
of pellets wi 11 be feasible. Thi s causes a reduction in the amount of chemi cally
reeoverable plutonium wastes.
14
The containment of fissile material is realised in the same manner as in
the Ref. plant I and 11.
4.4.2 Strategie Points
The fabrication process has been laid out in two parallel lines mainly
because of the fact that the core of a fast breeder has normally two zones
with two different plutonium eoncentrations. Because of this partieular layout,
two strategie points are required for the input and output streams. The feed
and the waste streams pass through the first strategie point which is located
in the cellar of the plant and the product stream leaves the plant through
the second strategie point. The personne1 lock forms the third strategie point.
All the measuring instruments required to establish an independent material
balance and to execute other safeguards measures are all loeated at these stra-
tegie points. Since the containment and personnel lock signals ean be brought
to eüher of the first two strategie points, a11 the safeguards activities ean
be restrieted to these two points.
Beeause of a eonsiderably higher safeguards work load l.n this plant, 2-3 safe-
guards personnel would be required to perform all the safeguards duties.
5. Safeguards Measu!es a~~EffoE~
In this chapter, an effort has been made to lay down all the safeguards
neasures to be earried out by the safeguards personnel at the strategie points.
These measures involve firstly, the establislDent of an independent material
baL:mce and secondly. testing of the integrity of containment for the plant
ane! th(~ containers (bi rd cages, fuel pins and subassemblies) contain ing fissile
materials. The total expenditures per year inv01ved in executing these measures
h<1\'(' then heen estimated for each of the reference plants. An evaluation index
hd!, flePH defi neo, based on the sped fj C s<lfeguards expendj tures OFI/kv fj 5S; 1e
n'c3.terial sefevuarcied in a nartJcular "tr::>a;:l) and the standard deviation of
m"~i1SUrelllent:lt a f;iven strategie point, to show the relative ;mportance of the
individual strategie points.
A.ll the safeguards measures tü be carried out for estahli shinV a material
[lalan.:." anci testing the containnent of plar-ts and cont2inprs :lave hePTI indicated
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in Tables IX, X and XI for the three reference plants I, 11 and 111 respec-
tively. The independent material balance for the uranium plant (Ref. I) is
established by weighing the UF6 cylinders and mass spectrometrically analys-
ing the U-235 content at the feed point, by measuring the U-235 concentration
in completed pins by a lead-pile spectrometer at the product end and by chemi-
cally analysing the U-235 concentration in liquid waste streams. For the
plutonium reference plants 11 and 111, it is established either by measuring
the plutonium content in the incoming bird cages with a colorimeter (defined
as the upper limit in the respective tables) or by accepting the data from
the shipper plant (defined as the lower limit in the respective tables),by
measuring calorimetrically the plutonium in the completed pins (Ref. 11) or
in subassemblies (Ref.III) at the product point, and measuring the plutonium
content in the waste stream by neutron counters.
It is to be no ted that the process inventory in all the three plants can be
temporarily converted into one of the output streams and measured with the
respective instruments.
The containment measures are similar for all the three plants. They include,
identification and destruction of seals at the feed point (UF6 cylinders for
plant I, plutonium bird cages for plants 11 and 111), sealing at product point
(subassemblies for plants land 111, pins for plant 11), and sealing of waste
containers (only for plants 11 and 111). Observation of all containment signals
for the emergency exits, containment walls and personnel locks at the strate-
gie points also fall under this catagory.
A certain amount of computer work has been included in the safeguards activities
for all the three plants. It is expected that the establishment of material
balance will be facilitated considerably with the use of computers, particularly
for the plant land 111.
The time required to execute the safeguards measures has also been estimated
for the upper and the lower limit for the three plants. In all these plants,
the reduction in time for the 10wer limit is main1y due tö the elimination
of the flow measurement at the feed point. For plant 111 a further reduction
has been shown for the waste stream (Tab1e XI). It is possib1e to reduce the
measuring time of neutron counting for the barrels and the bottles by a factor
of two.
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The number of inspeetion personnel for eaeh of the plants has been ea1eulated
on the basis of the time required. For the reference plant 11, the estimate
for the lower limit gives only 722 hrs/a. Sinee this eorresponds to 1ess than
50 % load faetor for a single person (normal working hours of an inspeetion
personnel 8.200 = 1600 hrs/a) ,an inspeetor has been alloeated only 50 % of
the total time in a year for this ease.
5.2 Standard Deviations at Strategie Points
In Table VIII, the total standard deviations for the feed, product and
waste streams (in kgfo 0 1 ja) have been shown for the three plants. These1SS] e
streams have been defined as the strategie points, although they have been
eombined at one or two strategie areas in the referenee plants as indieated
earlier. As ean be seen, the standard deviations (i.e. the uneertainty with
whieh the fissile material amounts passing through a strategie point, ean be
determined) are surprisingly low. For example in referenee plant I, the standard
deviation in a year is only :. 0.36 kg of U-235 for a total of 6900 kg U-235
in the produet stream. For referenee plant 11 it is :. 0.35 kg for a total of
1750 kg plutonium,and for plant 111 it is :. 1.46 kg for a total of 11 600 kg
of plutonium. The main reason is the large number of measurements made in a
year.
5.3 Efforts 1n exeeuting Safeguards Measures
The total amount of efforts is eomposed of the time spent by the personnel
in exeeuting the safeguards measures, the eapital investments for material
balance and containment measures, and running expenditures for operation and
maintenanee. All these efforts ean be reduced to the corumon denominator of
a monitary unit. In other words, the expenditures involved in these efforts
which would oe incured oy a safeguards authority in a year, can be estimated,
provided the speeific eosts for these efforts are known.
The yearly expenditures for each of these strategie points have been estimated
for the three referenee plants and shown in Tables XII, XIII and XIV respeetively.
These expenditures ean be regarded as conservative as the capita1 investments
and the operation costs for all the measuring instruments and sealing units
have been eharged to the inspeetion system, although the plant operators eould
use them and would even benefit from them. Only the computer eosts have been
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halved between the plant operators and inspeetion authority for the plants
land 111. The yearly personnel eosts have been distributed among the strate-
gie points aeeording to the pereentage of time spent by the inspection per-
sonnel for a given strategie point.
Point 7 in thesetables gives an idea on the effort spent for a kg of fissile
material safeguarded at a strategie point. The maximum specifie amount spent
is always for the waste stream, although less than 0.5 % of the total material
is safeguarded in this stream. The same point shows that the total effort at
the feed point, ean be reduced signifieantly if throughput messurements at
this point are eliminated and inspeetors data from the shipping plant are
used instead.
5.4 Evaluation Index for Strategie Points
The importanee of a strategie point in any nuclear facility may be eonsidered
to be a funetion of the standard deviation (i.e. the range of uncertainty in
estimating the amount flowing through the plant) and the total effort spent
at the strategie point. The first faetor indi.eates the di ffieulty with whi eh
a diversion ean be identified as a diversion. The larger the standard devia-
tion, the larger is the diffieulty. The seeond term gives an indieation of the
magnitude of the effort spent in generating the standard deviation. If the
effort is disproportionately high, different means have to be investigated to
reduee it. A eombination of these two terms should therefore give an idea on
the importanee of a strategie point from the point of view of safeguards. A
high value of this eombination for a strategie point wculd mean that more
attention has to be paid to this point, either to reduee the standard devia-
tion or to reduee the effort.
As a first trial. the eontribution 0. Y DM/kg f . has been used for this purposeI' 1SS
and defined as the "Evaluation Index lJ • 0 is the standard deviation in kg/a
(Table VIII) and the term under the square root is the speeifie safeguards
eosts at a given strategie point. Point 8 in Tables XII, XIII and XIV gives
the different values of the evaluation index for the different strategie points
in the three referenee plants. Point 9 of the same tables gives the relative
importanee of the strategie points whieh is the pereentage eontribution of an
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evaluation index for a strategic point to the sum of the evaluation indices
for all the strategie points.
For plant I the relative importances of the strategie points are almost equally
distributed. For plant 11 the relative importance of the product end and the
waste point is almost equally high, the former on account of high standard
deviation, the latter beeause of the high specific safeguards eosts. In plant
111, the relative importance of the waste stream has beenreduced to the level
of the feed stream, mainly beeause the pereentage of fissile material in the
waste stream has been redueed eompared to that for the plant 11.
5.5 Specific Safeguards Costs for Reference Plants
The year~y estimated eosts for safeguards as weIl as the speeific safeguards
costs for the the three reference plants have been shown in Table xv. It
becomes onee more apparent that elimination of flow measurements at the feed
point causes a significant reduetion in the total costs. The reduction in
specific safeguards costs with increasing size of the plant is also quite
evident (from 30 DM/kg to 14 DM/kg for a plutonium plant).
The specific safeguards costs appear to be quite low particularly in view
of the fact that all the capital and operation eosts for the instruments at
the strategie points have been charged to the safeguards system. On the other
hand, these costs represent only the field costs for safeguards. Central orga-
nization charges have to be added to these costs to obtain the total expendi-
ture.
5.6 Safeguards costs in relation to fabrieation eosts
The high cost effeetiveness of such a safeguards system as has been dis-
eussed in this paper, can be illustrated in a fairly eonvincing manner,
by setting the safeguards costs in relation to the specific fabrication
costs (DM/kg heavy metai). The fabrication costs for light water fuel
elements in reference plant I,would normally range between 250-300 DM/kg
heavy metal (U-235 + U-238). The safeguards costs as estimated here turn
out to be only around 1.3 DM/kg heavy metal. This is 1ess than 0.5 % of the
total fabrication costs or, less than 1/1000 Dpf/kWh if expressed in terms
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of specific energy generation costs. Similar relations are obtained
for the plutonium fabrication plants. The averaged fabrication costs for
the core and the axial b1anket fuel would be around 800 DM/kg heavy metal
in reference plant 11, and around 500 DM/kg heavy meta1 in reference plant
111. The safeguards costs expressed in the same units would be approximate-
ly 4-7 DM/kg heavy meta1 and 1.0 - 1.5 DM/kg heavy meta1 respectively.
These values correspond to 0.5 - 0.9 % of the fabrication costs for
reference plant 11 and 0.2 - 0.3 % for reference plant 111.
Although the safeguards cost figures are rather approximate, an increase
in these costs even by a factor of 2 or 3 wou1d not change the above mentioned
trend appreciab1y.
6. Conc1usions
A number of generalized conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the analysis
presented in the paper. They are summarized be1ow:
6.1 The fabrication requirements in Germany are expected to increase
rapidly in the coming years. However, a number of parallel units will be
installed to meet the total yearly requirement. Therefore, a 230 t/a
plant for LWR fuel elements and a 10 t/a and a 100 t/a plant respectively,
for fast breeder fuel elements represent the wide spectrum of the plant
sizes to be expected in the coming decade.
6.2 The measuring instruments under deve10pment at Karlsruhe appear adequate
for such plants. The lead pile spectrometer with a coefficient of
variation of + 2 % per pin, gives an overall standard deviation of
only ~ 0.35 kg U-235/a for a total of 6900 kg U-235/a. With a calori-
meter coefficient of variation of ~ 0.4 %, an overall standard deviation
of ~ 1.46 kg Pu/a for a total of 11600 kg Pu/a is obtained. These low
ranges are mainly obtained because of the large number of measurements
carried out in a year.
6.3 Any fabrication plant can be laid out in such a manner as to optimize
the effectiveness of both the aafeguards measures and plant operation,
provided the present trends of automation and rationalization possibi-
lities are fully utilized.
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6.4 The problem of serapsean be eompletely eliminated in such layouts.
They ean oe eireulated internally in a continuous manner or brought
out to one of the strategie points in homogenized batehes and measured
with the same aeeuraey as that for the feed or the produet stream.
6.5 The pereentage of irreeoverable fissile material wastes ean be redueed
by almost an order of magnitude (0.1 % instead of 1 % inpresent day plants)
in the referenee plants, mainly beeause of automation and rationalization
of proeess steps.
6.6 In all these plants, the fissile material storage areas ean be laid out
as strategie areas to which all the safeguards activities can be
restrieted.
6.7 A significant reduction in safeguards activities and costs can be
achieved if fissile material flow measurements at the feed point are
eliminated and the inspectors data for the shipper plant are used
for material balance. The personnel requirement in that case will be
around 1 or 2 (2 only for the large Pu-plant in the eighties) per plant.
6.8 The specific field safeguards eosts in DM/kg fissile material safeguarded
are estimated to vary between 40 DM/kg uranium and 14 DM/kg plutonium.
They can be eonsiderably redueed if apart or the whole of the measuring
instrumente eosts are taken over by theplant operators, as they have
to measure the flow in any case.
6.9 Thehigh cost effectiveness of a safeguardssystem based on fissile
material control at strategie points, as discussed in this paper, ean
be eonvincingly illustratedby the fact that the total safeguards eosts
for the three referenee plants make out only 0.2 - 0.5 % of the fabrication
costs respeetively,in DM/kg of heavymetal fabricated.
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REACTOR DATA FOR ESTlMATING THROUGHPUTS IN FABRICATION PLANTS
Net electrical power
Thermal efficiency
Load factor
Average burnup
In-pile time
Inventory:
U (tot)
Pu (tot)
Radial blanket
Core + axial blanket
Running requirement:
U (tot)
Pu (tot)
Rad.blanket
Core + Ax. blanket
Pu-dischange factor
Dimensions
/- MWd 7
- t-
l-8_1
l-t/GWe_1
/-t/GWe 1
- -
l-t/GWe_1
l-t/GWe_1
/-t/GWe a 1
1 t/GWe a_1
L-t/GWe a_7
/-t/GWe a 1
- -
LWR
1
0.35
0.7
27000
4.8
130.
40.
0.150
Plutonium
Fast Breeder
1
0.43
0.7
25700+)
1.66
49.7
2.7
27.9
24.6
21.6
1.6
8a4
14.8
0.155
+) Averaged over core, axial and half of the radial blanket.
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TABLE H. ESTlMATED THROUGHPUT /-t heavy meta1/a_7 IN FABRICATION PLANTS
IN GERMANY
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000
Estimated nuclear p~wer _
demand LGWe_/ 10 28 84 200
LWR L-GWe_7 10 28 64 116
Breeder L-GWe_1" 0 2 20 84
- t 7 556 3180 5300U-throughput (LWR)/ - 1330
- a-(3% endched)
- t - 320 1130Radial blanket(FB)/ - / 0 20,0
- a-(depleted uranium)
Pu-throughput (FB)/-! 7 0 3,0 52 190
- a-
Core + ax.b1anket
- t 7(FB) / - 0 40,0 460 1700
- a-
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TAßLE 111. CRITERIA FOR INDlRECT MEASURING METHODS OF FISSILE MATERIAL
CONTENT IN FRESH, L~IRRADIATED FUEL PINS Al1D SUBASSEMBLIES
Criteria
1. Tamperproofness
2. Free from systematic errors
3. Capacity of discrimination
4. Low measuring time
5. Accurate
6. Simple, re1iable, easy to
automatise and adaptable to
continuous operation
7. Economic
Remarks
Against all conceivable measures,
which can simulate the presence of
the absence of one of the fissionable
elements (inhomogenity, addition or
removal of absorbers, reflectors,
and foreign neutron and heat source)
Any bias in the measurement should
be identifiable and correctable
The method should be capable of
discriminating between uranium and
plutonium
Depends on the throughput and the
number of measuring units used in
a plant. For 1 t heavy metal/d
capacity fabrication plant and one
measuring unit, the measuring time
should not exceed 2-3 minutes/pin
For the same throughput as in (4)
the overall measuring accuracy for
Pu should be greater than + 0.4 %
and that for U-235 + 1.6 % (1-0 va1ue)
TABLE IV.
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HEAT PRODUCTION AND OVERALL ERROR IN TRE MEASUREMENT
OF CALORlMETRY ON ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS SOURCES OF ERROR
Isotope %
Cone.
error
%
(1-0 value)
heat production
w/g of isotope
watts
PU38 0.27099 1.3 0.569 0.001542
PU39 75.492 0.21 0.001923 0.0014517
Pu40 17.9703 0.56 0.00703 0.0012633
PU41 4.8261 0.97 0.0045 0.0002172
PU42 1.0704 1.33 0.00012 1. 28
10-6
Am41 0.3699 1.5 0.1084 0.000401
Total (on account of Pu-
isotopes and Am241 )
Error on account of
reproductibility
Total error
0.45
0.6 - 1.0
0.8 - 1.2
0.00488 w/g
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TABLE V. SPECIFICATION OF TRE SLOWING DOWN TIME SPECTROMETER FOR
U-235 ASSAY IN FUEL PINS FOR LWR TYPE BEING DEVELOPED BY
FIRMA INTERATOM IN COLLABORATION WITR TRE KARLSRUHE RESEARCH
CENTER
Throughput 600 pins))/day of 24 hrs.
(measuring time of ~3 min./pin
corresponding to a 1 t/d fabrication
plant)
U-235 concentration
in a pin
U-238 concentration
Aeeuracy of measurement
(eoeffieient of variation
1-0 value)
upto + 5 %
95-100 %
<2 % / pin
The system will consist of automatie fuel pin feeding meehanism~ neutron
generator, lead pile, photon reeoil counters, automatie data processing,
recording and selecting a system and all the other necessary accessories.
1) Specifieation of fuel p1n
Length
DiametE!r
Chemical form of
fuel
Canning material
Amount of total
uranium/pin
Amount of U-235/pin
3000 mm
upto 15 mm
UOz pellets
Zircalloy
1.8 kg
56 g
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TAßLE VI. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRE TRREE REFERENCE FABRICATION PLANTS
I 11 III
LWR-fuel Fast-Breeder Fast-Breeder
elements fuel elements fuel elements
(1972) (eore+ax. b1.) (eore+ax. b1.)
(1972) (1980)
2
1
50.0
390.0
0.2
2672
6.7
40 (Pu)
U(dep1.), Pu
I)19,4; 24,6
500 kg (U+Pu)02
150.000
1430
4 - 5
230
11.6 (Pu)
U02 , Pu02
D02 , Pu02
8.8
35.2
1
1
20
200
1. 76 (Pu)
3000
6.5
43 (Pu)
50 kg(U+Pu)02
34.000
205
_2)
U(dep1.), Pu
1
1
1000
1480 kg UF6
1137 kg D02
170.000
620
3 - 4
230
230 (3%U)
2917
10.7
48 (U235)
I
I
jU(enriehed)
1
1 3.0
I
I
I
!
Fuel pins
Subassemblies
Ceramie l-kg_1
Pellets
No.ofworking days/a
Throughput L-t/a_1
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
5.7.
5.8.
7.1.Material
7.2.Personnel
1. Type of material
2. Pu(tot)-enriehment lXI
3. U-235 enriehment 1%1
5. Throughput Iday:
5.1. Feed-point ~: ~u
Conversion
4. Fuel eomposition:
4.1. Feed-point
4.2. Produet
,
I
6.1. Length ~mm-7 I
6.2. Diameter I mm I
6.3. Fissile m~terial ~
i
7. Nu~ber of strategie I
p01nts I
6. pin eharaeteristies:
l)Of eore I and eore 11 fuel respeetively
2)No assemb1y station
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TABLE VII. FISSILE MATERIAL CONCENTRATIONS IN VARIOUS WASTE STRE&~S
OF TRE THREE ~~FERENCE FABRICATION PLANTS
1. Specific amount of
irrecoverable wastes
Heterogeneous
150 1 barrel/kg fissile
gm fissile/barrel
Homogeneous
l/kg fissile
gm fissile/l
2. Total amount of
irrecoverable wastes
Heterogeneous
150 1 barrel/a
kg fissile/ a
Homogeneous
1/a
kg/a
Total kg/a
3. Irrecoverab1e wastes
% of input
4. Accuracy of measurement
/-% 7
Unit amount for each
measurement
Heterogeneous /barrel 7
Homogeneous
I
LWR
fue1 element
(1972)
5
0.2 (U)
1150 • 103
230 (37.U)
230
0.10
5
II
FBR
fuel element
(1972)
0.5
10
6
0.1 (Pu)
880
8.8
10.5 '103
l.05
0.56
10
1
50
III
FBR
fuel element
(1980)
0.5
2 (Pu)
6
0.1 (Pu)
5800
12
19
0.15
10
1
50
TABLE VIII. RANGE OF m~CERTAINTIES (1 0') AT STRATEGIe POINTS FOR THE THREE REFERENCE PLANTS
11. 6 (Pu)
I
4 (kgPu/Bc) ! 4 (kgPu/Bc)
2900 I 2900
0.2 I 0.4
0.43 I 0.86
I
0.384 (Pu)
4 (kgPu/Bc)
440
0.4
0.336
(Pu)
I 11 111
Strat. pt. I Data I LWR FBR FBRI i (1972) _ (1972) (1980)
- -- - - 'tot) - Shipper Receiver Shipper Receiver
--------- ---------------- ------- - ---------- --------------------------r-------------------------
1. Input IThroughput [t/~7 I 6.9 i 230 1. 76(Pu) :
Specific amount per meas. i.:k:§.~ _ '45 : 1500 4(kgPU/BC):
Number of measurements/year / 1 / ! 154 -15.4 440
- - i I
Coefficient of variation {-%_7 I 0.2 0.05 0.2 I
- - I ITotal stand.deviation / kg/a / I 1.1 _9.3 0.168 I
I - I) -- _I I
IImproved stand.deviation {kg/a_/ i 0.79 6.6 0.15
w
o
990
0.4
1.46 (Pu)
11. 6(Pu)
11.65 (kg Pu/SA)
(Pu)
(kgPu/1oo pins)
O./l
I 6.9(U-235) 11.75
I 0.049 (kgU5/ 14.28I -,I pin)
I 142 OOO(pins)1 410
! 2
0.366(U-235) 10.347 (Pu)
Specific amount per meas. 1.1<fL7
Number of measurements/year {-1_1
Coefficient of variation {-%_I
Total stand.deviation L-kg/a_1
2.Product !Throughput L-t/a_l
7 (Pu)
5 gr.
14000
10
bottles
I
I
I
I 0.019
0.024 (Pu)
bo t es barrels
( 1.05 (Pu) 12 (Pu)I
I 5 gr. 2 gr.
I 210 6000I
I 10 10I
I 0.007 0.015I
barrels
,
\ 0.031 (Pu)
i 8.8 (Pu)
10 gr.
880
10
0.03
6.9 (U-235)
0.06(kgU235)
115
5
0.032(U-235)
Throughput {-kg/a_1
Specific amount per meas. {1<g_1
Numberof measurements/year {-1_1
Coefficient of variation {-%_7
Total stand. deviation {-kg/a_1
3.Waste
I
Total stand.deviation for mat.ba1. 1)1.16 0.87 0.387 0.3801) 1.52 1. 50 1)
1) B • h' d . dd . .y uSIng s Ippers ata In a Itlon
TABLE IX. SAFEGUARDS MEASURES FOR INPUT AND OUTPUT STREAMS AND TIME REQUIRED FOR THEIR EXECUTION
FOR REF. PLANT I
Stream Safeguards measure No.of measures/a Time required
per unit measure
Total No. of working hours/a
Upper limit lower limit
Product Measurement in
Lead-pile spectrometer 142,000 pins/a
100 pins/batch
= 1420 batches/a
Feed
Waste
Weighing
Mass-spec.Anal.
Sealing/identification
Maintenance
Total
Sealing
~laintenance +
Standardization
Total
\
Chemical analysis
Samp1 ing+measurement
Total
154 cylinders a 1.5 t U
2 weighing/cylinder = 308
l/cylinder = 153
153
760 subassemblies
5 ,311 batches a 10 m
0.1 h/weighing
1 h/anal.
0.1 h/cylinder
10 min ./batch
0.5 hr/sub.
0.5 h/batch
0.2 h/batch
31
153
15
20
219
230
400
240
870
60
24
84
Assumptions (valid for Tabies IX to XIV
a) Working hours for a safeguards personnel/a =
b) Expenditure for safeguards personnel
Inspector =
Technician =
1600
50,000 DM/a
30,000 DH/a
Total
No. of safeguards personnel
1173
1 Inspector
c) Observation-time for containnlent and personnel lock signals
are included in the total time.
TABLE X. SAFEGUARDSHEASURES FOR INPUT AND OUTPUT STREAMS AND TIHE REQUlRED FOR THEIR EXECUTION
FOR REF. PLANT II
Stream Safeguards measure No. of measures/a Time required per
unit measure
Total No. of ~orking hours/a
Upper limit Lower limit
Feed Calorimetry 440 Bird cages
Sealing/identification 440 BC
Maintenance
Total
3 hr/4 BC
0.1 hr/BC
330
44
100
44
474 4/.
Product Calorimetry 41,000 pins/a;
100 pins/bundle 3 h/4 bundles
410 bundles/ a for calorimetry
Sealing/identification 169 pins/transport container 0.1 h/container
240 containers for sealing
Maintenance, standard.
Total
310
24
100
310
24
100
434
W
N
434
Waste Neutron counting
Sealing
Maintenance , standard.
Total
880 barresl a 10 gm. Pu
210 bottles a 50 1
5 gm Pu/bottle
880+ 210
0.1 h/barrel
0.1 h/bottle
1 min/barrel
6 min/bottle
88
21
15
70
50
88
21
15
70
50
244 241..
Assumptions see Table IX
No.of safeguards
personnel
Total 1152
1 Inspector
722
o.!; Inspector
TABLE XI. SAFEGUARDS MEASURES FOR INPUT AND OUTPUT STREAMS AND TIME REQUlRED FOR THEIR EXECUJION
FOR REF. PLANT 111
Stream Safeguards measure No.ofmeasures/a Time required per Total No. IOf working hours/a
unit measure Upper limit Lower limit
Feed Calorimetry 2900 BC 3 h /8 BC 1089
Sealing/identification 2900 BC 5 min/BC 250 250
Maintenance/Standard. 100 50
Total 143 300
Product Calorimetry 990 subassemblies 3 h/4 BA 742 742
Sealing 990 subassemblies 0.5 h/SA 495 495
Maintenance/Standard. 100 100 UJUJ
Total 133 1337
Waste Neutron counting 5800 barrels/a a 2 g Pu 0.1 h/2 barrels 290 145
1400 bott1es a 50 1;100 mg/l 0.1 h/2 bottles 70 35
Sealing 5800 barrels +
1400 bottles 1 min/unit 120 120
Maintenance/Standard. 100 100
Total 580 400
-
Total 335t 2037No. of safeguards personnel Inspector 1 Inspector
Assumption: see Table IX .. Technicians 1 Technici.an
TABLE XII. F.STTMATES OF COSTS FOR SAFEGUARDS 1'-fEASURES PER STRATEGIC POINT IN REFl.;RENCE PLANT I
U.L = upper limit
L.L = lower limit
Strategie Point Feed Product Waste
w
~
-
UL LL UL 1.L UL LL
20. 1000 1000
30. 30 20 20
33 33 33 33 33 33
8 (1 8 8 5 5
91 69 1041 1041 58 58
-
12.9 9.8 147.8 147.8 8.2 8.2
9.4 1.8 37.1 44.0 3.2 4.2
18.7 I 3.5 14.2 88 7.1 8.5
17.11 1.4 24 24 7 7
1.8 1.4 20 20 1.2 1.215.3 4 4 5.8 5.8etc. )
3,4) 3.9 1.3 20.9 21.6 1.8 1.9
43.3 14.3 229.8 237.4 20.2 21.3-_.
-
-DM/kgU 87.8 192 •60.19 0.06 1.0 1.03
_[DM/kgU-2346.27 2.1 33.3 34.4 2927 13087I
I1.59 2.11 2.14 1. 73 Is 1.97 I 1. 78
133.9 28.9 • 36.3 38.8 29.8 132 •3: I II , II i , II I ii
--'--------_._,_..~__'--------. - -"-_._-,---~--
- 3 .-1. Capital investments / 10 DM I
Weighing --
Lead Pile
Spectrometer
Sea1ing
Iden ti ficat ion
Storage
Data processing
Misee11aneous
Total
2. Annua1 capital 3
Charges (14,2%) [-10 DM/a_/
- 3 -3. Personne1 / 10 DM /
% of tota1-personnel
Costs (see Table IX)
4. Other operation
eosts (maintenanee,
uti1ities (2%of 1)
analysis eharges)
(mass-speetrometric, ehemicaJ
5. Miseel1aneous (10 % of sum 2"
6. Total year1y charges
(sum 2-5) 1-103DM/a_1
7a.Specific Safeguards charges 1
7b. Specifie S~feguards eharges
8. Evaluation Index 0) DM/kg fis
9. Relative Importance 1-%_7
TABLE XIII. ESTlMATES OF COSTb FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASURES PER STRATEGIC POINT IN REFERENCE PLANT 11 U.L. = upper limit
L.L. = lower limit
Strategie Point Feed Product Waste
6.41 4.2
17.21 1.6
20.6 1. 5
6.1
2.0
4.6
W
\J1
1.8
4.6
4.7
8.5
LL
3
i 30
. 331-
4.7
10.6
21.1 I 33.8
3
30
33
UL
3.7
6.2
15.6
15.0
LL
100
10
110
60.1
6.2
4.0
15.6
18.8
37.7
10
110
UL
100
0.7
11
10
1
LL
4.4
10
11
41.0
121
UL
100
1. Capita1 investment /-103DM 7
Calorimeter - -
Neutron counter
Glove box complete
Miscellaneous /-10 % from
Total investment 7
Total
2. A~nual capi!al_ch~rges _L14.2 %/a_/ L 10 DM/kg_/
- 3 -3. Personnel / 10 DM/a /
% of total-(see tableX}
- 3 -4. Other operation costs / 10"DM/a/
Maintenance, utilities, -
Computer rental etc.
5. Misc311ane~us (10 % of sum 2,3,4)
/ 10 DM/a /
6. Total
7. Specific Safeguards Charges
8. Evaluation Index
(!' Y-DM/kg - fi s s ile
9. Relative Importance /-% 7
27.6
0.76
19.1
48.6
4.5
0.36
10.6
8.0
25.5
1. 76
44.3
44.6
23.1
1.68
49.3
40.5
2190
1.45
36.6
21.9
1960
1.37
40.1
19.6
TAßLE XIV. ESTlMATES OF COSTS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASURES PER STRATEGIC POINT IN REFERENCE PLANT 111 U.L = upper limit
L.L = lower limit
Feed Produet Waste
Strategie Point
1. Capi tal investment L-103DM_] UL LL I UL LL IUL ILLI
Calorimeter 160 (2 units) - i 1~0 (1 unh) 100 (1 unit)
Neutron counter - - -
-
I 40 (2 uni t s) I 40 (2 uni t s )
Sealing and/or identifieation
investment I 30 I 30 I 30 I 30 10 110IG10ve box eomplete 10 10
Automatie transport loading
system 20 20
Data proeessing3) 33 33 33 ~ , 33 i 33I lMisee11aneous 3 3 3 16~ ! 3 3Total 256 96 166 1136 1136-- - -- :-- ;-'
2. Annua1 eapita1 eharges [l03DM/~1 I
24.01 I 19.3(la kg 7%; 14.7 %/a) 36.5 13.6 24.0 19.3 i 15.7 w- 3 - 47.0 52.5 19.0 0-3. Personneil 10 DM/a 1 11.8 43.8
% of total-personneI 42.8 14.7 39.8 65.6 19.4 I 19.7
eosts (see Tab1e XI)
1
- 3 -4. Other operation eosts 1 10'DM/a 1
Main tenanee, utili ties, -
materials ete. (2 % of 1) I 5.0 2.0 3. Si 3.5 2.7
I
2.7
5. Mi~eeFaneo~s (10 % of sum 2,3,4) I 8.8 2.7 7.31 8.0 4.1 3.7
I I1 10'DM/a 1 I
- - I 88.0 I I 41.4- 3 ' - 97.3 30.1 78.61 45.16. Total year1y eharges (sum 2-5){ 10 DM/~./
I7. Specific Safeguards charges
L-DM/kg fissile_I 8.5 2.6 6.8 I 7.7 2360 2190I
8. Evaluation Index t:rVDM/k-g-fiss 1.12 0.69 3.81 I 4.10 1.17 1.12
9. Relative Importance 1-%_7 18.4 11.6 62.5 1 69 •4 119.2 119.0
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TAßLE XV. SPECIFIC COSTS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASURES FOR TRE THREE
REFERENCE PLANTS
Ref. I Ref. II Ref. III
UL LL UL LL UL LL
Total safeguards 293.3 273.0 115 68.1 221 159
costs /-103 DMt_1
Total throughput 6.9 6.9 1. 76 1. 76 11.5 11.5
of fissile material /-t/a I
- -
Specific safeguards 42.5 39.6 65.4 38.7 19.2 13.9
costs L-DM/kg fissile I
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FIG.2 LAYOUT OF THE FABRICATION PLANT FOR
LWR FUEL SUBASSEMBLIES.
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FIG.3 LAYOUT OF THE FABRICATION PLANT FOR FAST BREEDER FUEL
REFERENCE PLANT II
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